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The Supreme Court of the United States and 
the Law of Libel: A Review of Decided Cases 
Edward G. HUDON* 
Pendant presque deux cents ans aux États-Unis, le droit du libelle a relevé 
exclusivement de la common law d'origine anglaise dont les États-Unis ont 
hérité au moment de la révolution américaine. Quiconque publiait, publiait à 
ses risques et périls. Selon le système constitutionnel américain à cette époque, 
toute expression diffamatoire, écrite ou verbale, même sans l'intention de 
diffamer autrui, était hors de la protection accordée par la constitution à la 
liberté de parole et de presse. Mais tout cela a changé avec le jugement de la 
Cour suprême des États-Unis dans New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, décidé en 
1964. En effet, ce jugement a déclaré que le droit du libelle selon la common 
law était, en bonne partie, incompatible avec la protection accordée à la liberté 
de parole et de presse par le premier amendement à la constitution des États-
Unis. 
Dans le présent article, l'auteur analyse les changements qui ont résulté de 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan depuis que ce jugement a été rendu. Il montre 
comment la Cour suprême elle-même a, de temps à autre, changé son 
interprétation de ce jugement, explique que ce changement résulte du change-
ment de personnel du tribunal lui-même et prédit qu'il y aura encore plus de 
changements dans le proche avenir. 
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Introduction 
For almost two hundred years, from the time the Constitution of the 
United States was brought forth from the Federal Convention of 1787 until 
1964 when the Supreme Court of the United States decided New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan ', the prevailing view in the American constitutional system 
was that libelous utterances were not "within the area of constitutionally 
protected speech..."2 At the time the Constitution was adopted, liability for 
defamation, both civil and criminal, was a part of the common law and there 
is no indication that the founding fathers intended to abolish that liability. 
Not even the protection given speech and press by the First Amendment as 
soon as the first Congress met changed this. In most of the jurisdictions of 
the United States, publishers continued to be civilly liable for defamatory 
publications regardless of intent3. Indeed, as late as 1909 no less an advocate 
of freedom of expression than Justice Holmes subscribed to the English view 
expressed by Lord Mansfield in King v. Woodfall that "Whatever a man 
publishes he publishes at his peril V It is for that reason that New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan5 represents such a milestone in the American judicial 
system. It did not abolish libel actions, but it brought about a major change 
in the standards applicable to such actions. Together with its progeny, it 
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
2. Herbert v. Lando, 60 L Ed 2d, 115,123 (1979, quoting from Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 
250, 266 (1952), and citing other cases. 
3. See Justice Byron WHITE'S discussion of this in Herbert v. Lando, 60 L Ed 2d 115, 123,124 
(1979). 
4. See Justice HOLMES' opinion in Peck v. Chicago Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909) 
citing and quoting from Lord Mansfield's opinion in the Trial Henry S. Woodfall, 20 
Howell's State Trials 895, 902 (1770). 
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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limited State power to award civil damages and to impose criminal sanctions 
in libel actions as it held that the common law of libel was, to a considerable 
extent, inconsistent with the First Amendment guarantees of speech and 
press. It is to the study of the origin and development of this major change in 
the American law of speech and press that has taken place in the short span 
of the last fifteen years that this paper is devoted. This will be done on a case 
by case approach to indicate the origin, development, and even the 
limitation of the New York Times doctrine, so-called. 
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the Establishment 
of a Federal Rule 
Prior to New York Times v. Sullivan6, the law of libel was one of strict 
liability and a question of State law, with a libel considered harmful on its 
face7. This was substantially changed by the Warren Court8 with the 
decision of this case which arose from a full page advertisement signed by 64 
people, some prominent and others not, that was carried in the May 20, 
1960, New York Times. The advertisement charged that the non-violent 
demonstrations of thousands of Southern Negro students in affirmation of 
the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights was being met by a "wave of terror." 
Included in the advertisement were statements, some of which were false, 
about police action against the students who participated in the demonstra-
tions'. 
Although Sullivan was not mentioned by name in the advertisement, he 
contended that the word police used in the third paragraph of the adver-
tisement referred to him as the elected Commissioner of Montgomery, 
Alabama, who supervised the police department ofthat city. Accordingly, he 
brought a civil libel action against the newspaper and four Negro Alabama 
clergymen. At the trial court level he was awarded $500000 in damages, the 
full amount claimed. Once the case reached the Supreme Court of the United 
States after it had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama 10, it was 
viewed as presenting for the first time the problem of "the extent to which 
the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to 
award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of 
his official conduct"." 
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
7. See footnote 4 to Justice WHITE'S opinion in Herbert v. Lando, 60 L Ed 2d 115, 123 
(1979). 
8. 1953-1969. 
9. See a copy of the advertisement reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion. 
10. 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962). 
11. 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). 
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In an opinion written by Justice William Brennan, the Supreme Court 
easily disposed of arguments that the judgments of the Alabama courts were 
insulated from constitutional scrutiny because the Fourteenth Amendment 
is directed at State rather than at private action, and that the guarantees of 
speech and press were inapplicable, at least as to the New York Times, 
because the allegedly libelous statements were a part of a paid "commercial" 
advertisement. The first argument was brushed to one side with the simple 
statement that "The test is not the form in which state power has been 
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been 
exercised u . " The second argument was as easily brushed to one side with the 
assertion that the fact that the New York Times was paid for the adver-
tisement was as immaterial "as is the fact that newspapers and books are 
sold13." For, the advertisement "communicated information, expressed 
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial 
support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters 
of the highest public interest and concern M." 
The Alabama law that was applied in the case by the Alabama State 
courts made a publication " 'libelous per se' if the words 'tend to injure a 
person... in his reputation' or 'to bring [him] into public contempt' " . " As 
for public officials, the standard was met if the words used were such as to 
"injure him in his public office, or impute misconduct to him in his office, or 
want of official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public trust ...1S" Or, as 
Justice Brennan noted, "where the plaintiff is a public official his place in the 
governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support a finding that his 
reputation has been affected by statements that reflect upon the agency of 
which he is in charge " . " Thus, under Alabama law the privilege of "fair 
comment" depended on the truth of the facts upon which the comment was 
based. Unless the burden of proving the truth could be discharged, general 
damages were presumed and could be awarded without proof of pecuniary 
injury. Moreover, although a showing of actual malice was a prerequisite to 
the recovery of punitive damages, good motives and the belief in truth did 
12. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
13. Ibid., p. 266. Actually, this second argument relied on Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 
(1942), in which the Court had held that a city ordinance forbidding the street distribution 
of commercial and business advertising matter was not an abridgment of the First 
Amendment, even though a handbill to which the city ordinance was applied had a 
commercial message on one side and a protest against certain official action on the other. 
For the Court's discussion of the Chrestensen case see pages 265,266 of Justice BRENNAN'S 
opinion. 
14. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
15. Ibid., p. 267. 
16. Ibid 
17. Ibid 
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not negate an inference of malice although they could serve in mitigation of 
punitive damages. 
After an exhaustive review of applicable case law, the Court came to the 
conclusion that the New York Times advertisement qualified for consti-
tutional protection as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the 
"major public issues of our time...18" Then, after a further study of case law 
and other authority the Court came to the conclusion that neither factual 
error, defamatory content, nor a combination of the two sufficed to remove 
the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct. With that out of 
the way, the Court then proceeded to fashion a "federal rule that prohibits a 
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating 
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 
'actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not " . " 
Once this "federal rule" had been fashioned, it was applied to the proof 
presented in the case to show actual malice which was then found to lack 
"the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands...20" 
Hence, the judgment against the petitioners was said to be without consti-
tutional support. This was found to be true even as to the New York Times 
which had not bothered to check the advertisement against news stories in its 
own files. At best, all that the evidence could support was a finding of 
negligence against the New York Times for having failed to discover the 
misstatements in the advertisement, and that was said to be "constitutionally 
insufficient to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual 
malice21." 
Last, but not least, although the statements in the advertisement could 
be taken as referring to the police, on their face, the Court concluded, they 
did not make "even an oblique reference to respondent as an individual22." 
Moreover, none of the respondent's witnesses suggested any basis in their 
testimony for the belief that the respondent was personally attacked in the 
advertisement beyond the bare fact that he was in overall charge of the 
Police Department, and therefore bore official responsibility for police 
conduct. The Court found disquieting the very proposition that what it 
considered to be an impersonal attack on government operations should 
serve as the basis for a libel on the person responsible for those operations. 
As he rejected the very thought of such a proposition, Justice Brennan wrote 
for the Court :23 
18. Ibid., 271. 
19. Ibid., 279, 280. 
20. Ibid., 285, 286. 
21. Ibid., 288. 
22. Ibid., 289. 
23. Ibid., 292. 
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Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of government will be 
penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts strikes 
at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression. 
2. The Extension of the New York Times Rule to Actions 
for Criminal Libel 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2* was decided on March 9, 1964. It had 
limited State power in a civil libel case. Slightly more than eight months 
later, on November 23, 1964, the Supreme Court extended the New York 
Times rule to limit State power to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of 
the official conduct of public officials as well. This happened in Garrison v. 
Louisiana2S in which the Court overturned the conviction of a State District 
Attorney of violating the Louisiana Criminal Defamation statute. Not only 
did this statute include punishment for false statements made with ill-will or 
without the reasonable belief that they were true, but also included 
punishment for true statements made with "actual malice" in the sense of ill-
will 26. 
The case arose out of a controversy between the District Attorney and 
judges of the Criminal District Court of Orleans Parish during which the 
former accused the latter of causing a large backlog of pending criminal 
cases by their inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations. He also accused 
the judges of hampering his efforts to enforce vice laws by their refusal to 
authorize disbursements for the expenses of undercover investigations in the 
enforcement of vice laws in New Orleans. 
At the outset, the Supreme Court saw no distinction between civil and 
criminal libel laws where criticism of public officials is concerned. In the 
instance of both, it found the interest in private reputation overborne by the 
larger public interest in the dissemination of the truth as secured by the 
Constitution of the United States. And even where an utterance is false, it 
held that "the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of 
expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any 
except the knowing or reckless falsehood27." The New York Times rule was 
held not to be rendered inapplicable merely because an official's private, as 
well as his public, reputation was harmed. As now extended to both civil and 
criminal libel actions, the test was said not to be keyed to ordinary care, but 
rather to the reckless disregard for the truth. 
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
25. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
26. La. Rev. Stat., 1950, Tit. 14. 
27. 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). 
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3. Who Is and Who Is Not a "Public Official" ? 
Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana were 
decided, on numerous occasions in libel cases there has been the question of 
who is and who is not a "public official". Indeed, in the New York Times Co. 
case the Court had itself stated that it did not have there the occasion to 
determine "how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the 
'public official' designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or 
otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be 
included28." The Court attempted to provide an answer in Rosenblatt v. Baer 
decided in 196629. 
In Rosenblatt, a former supervisor of a county recreation area employed 
by, and responsible to, three county Commissioners brought a civil action in 
a New Hampshire State court. The basis for the action in which damages 
were awarded was a newspaper column written by the petitioner. The 
column was critical of fiscal management under the respondent's regime and 
the question was asked: "What happened to all the money last year? and 
every other year?"3 0 As the Court pondered the questions presented by the 
case it noted that the elected Commissioners would have been barred from 
suit under the New York Times rule, but in order to determine whether or not 
the former supervisor was a "public official" it considered another matter. It 
rejected the notion that who is or is not a "public official" is to be decided 
with reference to state law. To adopt that idea, it said, would mean "that 'the 
constitutional limits of free expression in the Nation would vary with state 
lines'31." Then, after commenting that "Criticism of those responsible for 
government operations must be free, lest criticism of government itself be 
penalized32," it laid down the following broad principles :33 
It is clear, therefore, that the "public official" designation applies at the very least to 
those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the 
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
governmental affairs. 
With the remark that it was for the trial judge to determine whether or 
not the proof showed the respondent to be a "public official", the case, was 
reversed and remanded. However, Rosenblatt v. Baer did not settle the 
matter. There was more to come. 
28. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283, footnote 23 (1964). 
29. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
30. See facts at pages 78, 79 of the Court's opinion. 
31. Ibid., p. 84, citing Pennekamp v. Florida, 238 U.S. 731, 735 (1964). 
32. Ibid., p. 85. The trial in the case had taken place before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was 
decided. For that reason, the Supreme Court concluded that the respondent should be 
given an opportunity to adduce proofs to bring his claim outside the New York Times rule. 
33. Ibid, p. 85. 
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4. The New York Times Rule Further Extended: State Legislators, 
Understandable and Incidental Error, and "Public Figures" 
During the October Term, 1966, three more significant cases were 
decided by the Supreme Court which both extended and explained the New 
York Times rule. In the first, Bond v. Floyd u, among other things it was 
argued that the New York Times principle should not be extended to 
statements made by a state legislator "because the policy of encouraging free 
debate about governmental operations only applies to the citizen-critic of the 
government35." However, the Court could not find support for such a 
distinction in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan or in any other of its decisions. 
Indeed, it found that the interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public 
issue "is hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics 
than to legislators36." Therefore, action by the Georgia House of Repre-
sentatives to bar the appellant Bond from taking the seat to which he had 
been elected because of his anti-Vietnam War and anti-draft statements was 
found to violate his First Amendment rights. 
In Time, Inc. v. HUP1, the second October Term, 1966, case, the 
Supreme Court held, as it had in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, that First 
Amendment guarantees "can tolerate sanctions against calculated falsehood 
without significant impairment of their essential function38." But it also 
held :39 
We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free 
press in a free society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying 
to a certainty the facts associated in news articles with a person's name, picture or 
portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory matter. Even negligence would be 
a most elusive standard, especially when the content of the speech itself affords no 
warning of prospective harm to another through falsity. A negligence test would 
place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the 
reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a 
name, picture or portrait. 
The basis for Time, Inc. v. Hill was an article published in Life Magazine 
about a play that portrayed an incident marked with violence during which 
an entire family was held hostage in its home and then released. The article 
related the play to an actual incident during which a family — the Hill family 
— was taken hostage and released unharmed and without violence. Not only 
was the article illustrated with scenes staged at the former Hill home from 
34. 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
35. Ibid, 136. 
36. Ibid, p. 136. 
37. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
38. Ibid, 389. 
39. Ibid. 
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which the family had moved to avoid further publicity that had caused 
extensive involuntary notariety, but it was entitled "True Crime Inspires 
Tense Play." The article carried the subtitle, "The ordeal of a family trapped 
by convicts gives Broadway a new thriller, 'The Desperate Hours'40 ." 
Alleging that the Life article gave a knowingly false impression of what 
had happened, the appellee Hill sought, and was awarded, damages under a 
New York statute that provided a cause of action to a person whose name or 
picture is used by another without consent for purposes of trade or 
advertising41. Time Inc.'s defense was that the article was about a subject of 
legitimate news interest — a subject of general interest and of value and 
concern to the public. 
After restating the New York Times principle and adding to it, the 
conclusion reached by the Court was that "Life's conduct here was at most a 
mere understandable and incidental error of fact in reporting a newsworthy 
event42." Then it added:43 
One does not have to be a prophet to foresee that judgments like the one we here 
reverse can frighten and punish the press so much that publishers will cease trying to 
report news in a lively and readable fashion as long as there is — and there always 
will be — doubt as to the complete accuracy of the newsworthy facts. Such a 
consummation hardly seems consistent with the clearly expressed purpose of the 
Founders to guarantee the press a favored spot in our free society. 
Time, Inc. v. Hill is also important because it definitely brought "public 
figures" within the ambit of the New York Times rule. 
In the third October Term, 1966, case, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts", 
decided together with Associated Press v. Walker, the Court attacked directly 
the question of who is and who is not a "public figure" which it recognized 
had not been fully settled in the Garrison*5, Rosenblatt*6, and the Time, 
Inc., *7 cases. In the Curtis Publishing Co. case compensatory and punitive 
damages were sought for an article that accused the respondent Butts, the 
athletic director of the University of Georgia, of trying to "fix" a football 
game by allegedly revealing the University of Georgia football team's plays, 
defensive plans, etc., to the coach of the opposing team. In Associated Press 
v. Walker compensatory and punitive damages were sought for a news 
dispatch which charged Walker with having personally taken control of a 
40. See statement of facts at page 377 of the Court's opinion. 
41. New York Civil Rights Law, §§ 50-51. 
42. 385 U.S. 374, 400 (1967). 
43. Ibid., 400, 401. 
44. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
45. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
46. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
47. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
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violent crowd in a University of Mississippi riot, and with having led the 
crowd in a charge against federal marshals sent to effectuate a court decree 
ordering the enrollment of a negro. Neither Butts nor Walker were "Public 
Officials" at the time the events involved in the respective cases took place. 
Butts was employed by the Georgia Athletic Association, a private corpora-
tion, rather than by the State ; Walker, a former Major General in the U.S. 
Army, was now a private citizen who had resigned from the Army after a 
long and distinguished career to enter politics. 
Again, a majority could be found to decide the case but not to join in an 
opinion of the Court. In an opinion in which three other members of the 
Court joined48, Justice Harlan wrote that Butts and Walker both 
commanded a substantial amount of public interest at the time of the 
publications and that both would have been labeled "public figures" under 
ordinary tort rules, but that "both commanded sufficient continuing public 
interest and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able 
'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory 
statements49." Then Justice Harlan added :50 
These similarities and differences between libel actions involving persons who are 
public officials and libel actions involving those circumstanced as were Butts and 
Walker, viewed in light of the principles of liability which are of general applicability 
in our society, lead us to the conclusion that libel actions of the present kind cannot 
be left entirely to state libel laws, unlimited by any overriding constitutional 
safeguard, but that the rigorous federal requirements of New York Times are not the 
only appropriate accommodation of the conflicting interests at stake. We consider 
and would hold that a "public figure" who is not a public official may also recover 
damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to 
reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an 
extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily 
adhered to by responsible publishers. 
Chief Justice Warren concurred in the result in an opinion in which he 
pointed out that the present case did not involve "public officials" as in New 
York Times, but "public figures" "whose views and actions with respect to 
public issues and events are often of as much concern to the citizen as the 
attitudes and behavior of 'public officials' with respect to the same issues and 
events51." However, he disagreed with Justice Harlan's opinion which he 
thought departed from the standard of New York Times when, in the case of 
"public figures," it substituted a standard based on "highly unreasonable 
conduct "," To him, to differentiate between "public figures" and "public 
48. Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas. 
49. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967), quoting from Brandeis, J., dissenting in Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
50. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
51. Ibid., 162. 
52. Ibid., 163. 
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officials" and adopt separate standards of proof for each had no basis in law, 
logic, or First Amendment policy. 
In final analysis, the award of damages against the Curtis Publishing 
Co. was upheld on the basis that the jury must have found that the 
magazine's investigation in the preparation of the story was grossly ina-
dequate, and that the evidence supported such a finding. Associated Press v. 
Walker was reversed on the basis that the evidence could support no more 
than a finding of ordinary negligence which would not warrant an award of 
damages. 
Perhaps Justice White provided the best summation of what the Court 
had accomplished to this point with its New York Times doctrine when he 
wrote as follows in St. Amant v. Thompson53 with reference to the cases in 
which the doctrine had been applied :54 
These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a 
reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before 
publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the 
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. 
Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and 
demonstrates actual malice. 
The Justice recognized that such a test "puts a premium on ignorance, 
encourages the irresponsible publisher not to inquire, and permits the issue 
to be determined by the defendant's testimony that he published the 
statement in good faith and unaware of its probable falsity55." However, he 
dismissed this as follows :56 
Concededly the reckless disregard standard may permit recovery in fewer situations 
than would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or 
the prudent publisher. But New York Times and succeeding cases have emphasized 
that the stake of the people in public business and the conduct of public officials is 
so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary care would 
protect against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First Amendment 
policies. Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First 
Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation. But to 
insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is 
53. 390 U.S. 727 (1968). St. Amant v. Thompson involved a televised political speech in which 
answers put to a union official falsely charged a public official with criminal conduct. The 
Court concluded that the evidence in the case did not support the conclusion that the 
petitioner had acted in reckless disregard of whether the statements were false or not. See 
also, Berkley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967), in which three newspaper 
editorials criticizing the official conduct of an elected court clerk were found not to reveal 
the high degree of awareness of probable falsity demanded by the New York Times 
doctrine. 
54. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid., 731, 732. 
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essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as 
true ones. We adhere to this view and to the line which our cases have drawn 
between false communications which are protected and those which are not. 
5. Justice Hugo Black and the New York Times Rule 
St. Amant v. Thompson notwithstanding, how much the Warren Court 
accomplished in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts51 — indeed, how much it 
accomplished with the rule announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan58 
— appears problematical if one reads what Justice Black had to say about it. 
Certainly, the doctrine had served to decide cases, but it still left open the 
question of whether it had developed a rule of decision that could consistently 
be applied in such cases, or whether it had done no more than suggest 
various experimental expedients that could be applied in one way or another 
on a case by case basis. This was vividly brought out in Justice Black's 
opinion in which he dissented in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts59 while he 
concurred in the result in the companion case, Associated Press v. Walker60. 
At the outset, Justice Black stated that he agreed with Chief Justice 
Warren's opinion so that the Court could decide the case in accordance with 
the doctrine to which the majority adhered. However, he was careful to 
point out that in doing this he did not recede from the opinions that he had 
expressed earlier in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan61 and in Rosenblatt v. 
Baer " . To him, the Curtis Publishing Co. and the Walker cases illustrated the 
accuracy of his earlier predictions that the New York Times constitutional 
rule concerning libel was "wholly inadequate to save the press from being 
destroyed by libel judgments63." Indeed, to him the apparent contradictory 
results in the Curtis Publishing Co. and the Walker cases seemed "a strange 
way to erect a constitutional standard for libel cases64." Moreover, he 
considered that what the Court was doing was to review factual questions in 
cases decided by juries, a review which he considered to be in flat violation of 
the Seventh Amendment which assures the right to trial by jury in civil cases. 
He summarized the situation as follows:65 
It strikes me that the Court is getting itself in the same quagmire in the field of libel 
in which it is now helplessly struggling in the field of obscenity. No one, including 
57. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
59. 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967). 
60. Ibid. 
61. 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964). 
62. 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966). 
63. 388 U.S. 130, 171 (1967). 
64. Ibid. 
65. Ibid., 171, 172. 
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this Court, can know what is and what is not constitutionally obscene or libelous 
under this Court's rulings. Today the Court will not give the First Amendment its 
natural and obvious meaning by holding that a law which seriously menaces the 
very life of press freedom violates the First Amendment. In fact, the Court is 
suggesting various experimental expedients in libel cases, all of which boil down to a 
determination of how offensive to this Court a particular libel judgment may be, 
either because of its immense size or because the Court does not like the way an 
alleged libelee was treated. 
The only solution that the Justice saw to this dilemma was that the 
Court abandon New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and adopt a rule to the effect 
that the First Amendment was intended "to leave the press free from the 
harassment of libel judgments66." Perhaps so drastic a course is not called 
for and without a doubt there is merit to the New York Times rule, but fifteen 
years after it was announced the application of the rule does not appear to be 
consistent. 
6. The New York Times Rule: A Quagmire or a Rule of Decision? 
The wisdom of Justice Black's assertion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. 
Butts67 that with respect to the law of libel the Court was getting itself into 
the same "quagmire" in which it was already struggling with respect to 
obscenity is well brought out by Rosenbloom v. Metromedia61. It that case it 
was not a "public official" or a "public figure" who was involved, but a 
private individual who claimed that he was defamed by a defamatory 
falsehood uttered in a radio news broadcast about his alleged involvement 
in an event of public or general interest. The broadcast took place after the 
individual's arrest for the possession and sale of "obscene" literature. The 
only precaution taken by the broadcaster was to rely on a telephone call 
made by a police Captain providing information about the arrest and the 
offense charged. In earlier broadcasts made after the arrest the individual 
was named, in later ones he was not. One of the broadcasts in which he was 
named started out by informing the public : "City Cracks Down on Smut 
Merchants69." This was followed by a description of the location of the raid 
and of what was seized. 
After he had been acquitted of the criminal obscenity charge, the 
individual brought a diversity action in the United States District Court and 
sought damages under the Pennsylvania libel law. He recovered $25 000 in 
general damages and $750000 in punitive damages, the latter of which was 
66. Ibid., 172. 
67. 388 U.S. 130 (1968). 
68. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
69. Ibid., 33. 
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reduced to $250000 on remittitur. The United States Court of Appeals 
reversed70 on the basis that the broadcasts involved "hot news" prepared 
under deadline pressure that concerned matters of public interest — that the 
fact that the person involved was not a public figure could not be accorded 
decisive importance if the importance of the guarantees of the First 
Amendment were to be adequately implemented. Once the case reached the 
Supreme Court, eight Justices participated in the decision which upheld the 
Court of Appeals. Again there was no majority opinion, only a plurality 
opinion, and it took five opinions to dispose of the case, none of which 
commanded more than three votes ". 
The gist of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion was that " 
It is clear that there has emerged from our cases decided since New York Times the 
concept that the First Amendment's impact upon state libel laws derives not so 
much from whether plaintiff is a "public official," "public figure," or "private 
individual," as it derives from the question whether the allegedly defamatory 
publication concerns a matter of public or general interest. 
The Justice dismissed as a "legal fiction" the notion that public figures have 
voluntarily exposed their lives to public inspection, while private individuals 
have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view. 
Justice Black's view expressed in dissent was that "the First Amendment 
does not permit the recovery of libel judgments against the news media even 
when statements are broadcast with knowledge that they are false73." 
Justice White stated that he could not join any of the opinions in the 
case because each of them decided "broader constitutional issues and 
displace[d] more state libel law than [was] necessary for the decision in [the] 
case74." 
Justice Harlan thought that the States should be able to allow private 
individuals to recover damages for defamation on the basis of any standard 
of care except liability without fault. 
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Stewart joined, thought that so 
long as there was not liability without fault, the States should be "essentially 
free to continue the evolution of the common law of defamation and to 
articulate whatever fault standard best suits the state's need75." 
70. 415 F. 2d 892, 895 (C.A. 3, 1969). 
71. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, Justices Black and White wrote separate 
opinions in which they concurred with the judgment, Justices Harlan and Marshall wrote 
dissenting opinions. 
72. 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971). 
73. Ibid., 57. 
74. Ibid., 59. 
75. Ibid., 86. 
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7. Private Individuals and the New York Times Rule: 
The Effect of a Change in the Composition of the Court 
Thus, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia did anything but clarify the law 
applicable in libel actions brought against the news media. If anything, it left 
this area of the law more confused than ever. But then, there is never a lack 
of speech and press cases and it was not very long before the Court had 
another chance to straighten things out. And in this next attempt which took 
place in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., decided in 197476, the situation was 
altered considerably by a change in the composition of the Court. Justices 
Black and Harlan, one a liberal and the other a conservative in matters of 
speech and press, had died and had been replaced by Justices Powell and 
Rehnquist, both conservatives. The outcome was that this time the Court 
was not only able to decide the case before it, but also to have a majority, 
though a slim one, to join in an opinion (five to four)77. 
Again in Gertz the issue was whether a newspaper or broadcaster that 
published a defamatory falsehood about an individual who was neither a 
"public official" nor a "public figure" could claim a constitutional privilege 
against liability. This time the individual was an attorney who represented 
the family of a murder victim in civil litigation against a Chicago policeman 
who had been convicted of the murder. The alleged defamatory material 
appeared in a John Birch Society magazine that warned against a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies. The article alleged 
that the policeman's trial was a "frame-up," implied that the attorney had a 
criminal record, and labeled him a "Communist-fronter78." 
As spokesman for the majority of the Court, Justice Powell reviewed 
the significant applicable decisions of the Court from New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan up to and including Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. Then he started off 
with what he termed to be "the common ground," i.e.,79 
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience 
of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the 
careless error materially advances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open" debate on public issues. 
76. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
77. Each of the four dissenters, Burger, C. J., Douglas, Brennan, and White, JJ., filed separate 
dissenting opinions. 
78. See pp. 325, 326 of the Court's opinion. 
79. Pp. 339, 340. 
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Then he continued : "Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy 
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate80." He 
added as others had before him : "The First Amendment requires that we 
protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters81." However, 
that is about as far as the so-called "common ground" extended. From that 
point on he appeared to adopt the views that Justice Harlan had expressed in 
dissent in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia*2, and made them the views of the 
Court. First, he drew a distinction between "public figures" and "private 
individuals." He pointed out that the latter are more vulnerable to injury 
since they do not have the access that "public officials" and "public figures" 
do to the media, and therefore do not have the same opportunity to 
counteract false statements. Therefore, it was his belief that the state interest 
in protecting private individuals is correspondingly greater. He concluded 
for the Court:83 
(...) the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal 
remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual. 
(...) 
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may 
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was simply found not applicable to a 
situation such as the one presented by this case that did not involve a public 
personality. As for who is or is not a "public personality," he provided the 
following guideline :84 
Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive 
involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public 
personality for all aspects of life. 
8. The New York Times Rule and Those Drawn Into the 
Public Forum Against Their Will 
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, decided in 19768S, the Supreme Court 
repeated its repudiation of the doctrine advanced in the plurality opinion in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia*6. Again it rejected the idea that falsehoods 
80. Ibid, 340. 
81. Ibid, 341. 
82. 403 U.S. 29,62 (1971). See also, Justice Harlan's views for the majority in Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. Bulls, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
83. 418 U.S. 323, 345-346, 347 (1974). 
84. Ibid, 352. 
85. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
86. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
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defamatory of private persons should have the benefit of the New York Times 
privilege whenever statements made concerned matters of general or public 
interest. The Court recognized that some participants in some litigation may 
be legitimate "public figures" generally or for the limited purposes of that 
litigation. Yet, it found little reason why the majority who, like the 
respondent, are drawn into the public forum largely against their will to 
obtain legal redress "should substantially forfeit that degree of the protection 
which the law of defamation would otherwise afford them simply by virtue 
of their being drawn into a courtroom87." 
As it reached this conclusion the Court noted that the public interest in 
accurate reports of judicial proceedings was already adequately protected by 
its 1975 decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn u. In that case the Court 
had held that the States are precluded from imposing civil liability based on 
the publication of truthful information found in official court records that 
are open to public inspection89. In the present case, the magazine had 
reported that the divorce granted on the respondent's husband's counter-
claim to her divorce action had been granted "on grounds of extreme cruelty 
and adultery90." Actually, the divorce had been granted on the grounds that 
neither party to the divorce proceedings was "domesticated, within the 
meaning of that term as used by the Supreme Court of Florida..."91 
The Court reaffirmed the position that it had taken in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc.91, as it held:93 
Dissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of "public 
controversy" referred to in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely 
wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading public. Nor 
did respondent freely choose to publicize issues as to the propriety of her married 
life. She was compelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain legal release 
from the bonds of matrimony. 
Recently, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, decided June 26, 197994, the Court 
added to what it said in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.95 and Time, Inc. 
87. 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976). 
88. 520 U.S. 469 (1925). 
89. In the Cox Broadcasting Corp. case, the appellant had broadcast the name of a deceased 
rape victim in violation of a Georgia Statute which made it a misdemeanor to publish or 
broadcast the name or identity of a rape victim. Ga. Code Ann. §26-9901 (1972). The 
appellant, a reporter, had learned the name of the victim from the examination of 
indictments made available for inspection in the courtroom during court proceedings 
brought against those accused of the rape. 
90. See the facts in the case, 424 U.S. 448, 452. 
91. Ibid., 451. 
92. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
93. 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). 
94. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979). 
95. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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v. Firestone96 concerning who is and who is not a "public figure" when it 
wrote :97 
Clearly those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their 
own defense by making the claimant a public figure. 
The occasion was the publicity that attended Senator Proxmire's "Golden 
Fleece of the Month Award" given to federal agencies that funded the 
petitioner scientist's study of emotional behavior. The purpose of the 
Senator's monthly award is to publicize examples of wasteful government 
spending. In this particular instance, the Senator's speech intended for 
delivery to the United States Senate was incorporated into an advance press 
release which was sent to 275 members of the news media throughout the 
United States and abroad. 
Had the Senator confined himself to delivering his speech in the Senate 
of the United States, he would have been protected by the Speech and 
Debate Clause of the United States Constitution98. However, in this 
particular instance the Senator was found to have gone beyond what is 
considered necessary to protect what is needed to preserve the legislative 
independence of Members of the Congress. Moreover, at no time had the 
petitioner thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence 
others, nor had he assumed any role of public prominence. Therefore, the 
New York Times doctrine was found not to apply to protect the Senator. 
9. The First Amendment and the Right to Publicity 
Zucchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co." was a different type case. 
It involved the "right to publicity" rather than the "right to privacy." It 
appears that the petitioner's 15-second "human cannonball" act in which he 
is shot from a cannon into a net 200 feet away was videotaped in its entirety 
without his consent and shown on television. The petitioner then brought an 
action for damages alleging the unlawful appropriation of his professional 
property. Although the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that the petitioner 
had a cause of action under the State law, relying on Time, Inc. v. Hill 10° it 
found for the respondent on the basis that the respondent had a right to 
include in its broadcasts matters of public interest otherwise protected by the 
right of publicity, "... unless the actual intent of the TV station was to 
appropriate the benefit of the publicity for some non-privileged private use, 
or unless the actual intent was to injure the individual ""." 
96. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
97. 99 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (1979). 
98. Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1. 
99. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
100. 385 U.S. 374 (1974). 
101. See statement of facts, 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977). 
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As the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, it noted that Time, 
Inc. v. Hill was a "right to privacy" case, not one that involved the "right to 
publicity." Moreover, it was "quite sure that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's 
entire act without his consent102." Indeed, the broadcast of the petitioner's 
entire act posed a substantial threat to the economic value of his perfor-
mance. It went to the very heart of the petitioner's ability to earn a living as 
an entertainer. The Court recognized that entertainment as well as news 
enjoy First Amendment protection, but it found it important to note "that 
neither the public nor respondent [would] be deprived of the benefit of 
petitioner's performance as long as his commercial stake in his act [was] 
appropriately recognized 103." The petitioner did not seek to prevent the 
broadcast of his performance, he simply wanted to be paid for it. 
10. The New York Times Rule and the State of Mind of the Defendant 
Herbert v. Lando, decided April 18, 1979, presented yet another novel 
First Amendment question — whether "when a member of the press is 
alleged to have circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to the 
plaintiffs reputation, the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial 
processes of those responsible for the publication, even though the inquiry 
would produce evidence material to the proof of a critical element of his 
cause of action 104." 
The controversy arose when the petitioner, a retired Army officer with 
extended war-time Vietnam service, brought suit against the respondent for 
having falsely and maliciously portrayed him in a television broadcast and a 
magazine article as a liar and as a person who had made cover-up charges to 
explain his relief from command. The petitioner had received widespread 
media attention when he had accused his superior officers of covering up 
reports of atrocities and other war crimes. Therefore he conceded that he 
was a "public figure" within the meaning of the New York Times rule, and 
therefore could not recover unless he could prove the publication of 
falsehood with the knowledge of the publication's falsity or with reckless 
disregard of whether or not it was false. As he prepared his case he sought 
answers to questions to which answers were refused on the basis that the 
First Amendment prohibits inquiry into the state of mind of those who edit, 
produce or publish, and into the editorial process 105. 
102. 433 U.S. 562, 575. 
103. Ibid., 578. 
104. 60 L Ed 2d 115, 121 (1979). 
105. See Rule 26(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits discovery of any matter 
"relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action" admissible in evidence or 
that "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 
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As the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision that the right 
to refuse to answer was absolute, it discussed the burden placed by New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan106 on any like the petitioner who seek damages for 
alleged libelous utterances. Not only did the Court point out that New York 
Times and its progeny had not suggested any First Amendment restrictions 
on sources from which the necessary evidence to prove the critical elements 
of such an action could be obtained, but also that these cases had made it 
essential in proving liability that such plaintiffs "focus on the conduct and 
state of mind of the defendant107." 
The Court also pointed out that even before New York Times publishers 
enjoyed certain qualified privileges that protected them from liability for 
libel unless publication was done with malice. Then it added that, traditio-
nally, Courts have admitted direct evidence relevant to the state of mind of a 
defendant and necessary to defeat a conditional privilege or enhance 
damages. Continued the Court : "The rules are applicable to the press and to 
other defendants alike..."108 Concluded Justice White for the Court:109 
In sum, contrary to the views of the Court of Appeals, according an absolute 
privilege to the editorial process of a media defendant in a libel case is not required, 
authorized or presaged by our prior cases, and would substantially enhance the 
burden of proving actual malice, contrary to the expectations of New York Times, 
Butts and similar cases. 
Justice White's opinion for the Court in Herbert v. Lando was anything 
but well received by the press. Indeed, columnists and radio and television 
reporters had a field day attacking the Court for granting what was 
interpreted to be permission to rummage into the minds of newspaper 
people '10. One columnist even went so far as to suggest that Justice White 
had the dubious honor of winning last year's Golden Zenger Award — a 
golden typewriter with an axe buried in the keys — an award given by a 
magazine to the person considered to have done the most to discredit the 
First Amendment '". But, whether one agrees with Justice White and the 
106. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
107. 60 L Ed 2d 115, 124 (1979). 
108. Ibid., 127. 
109. Ibid., 129. 
110. See for instance, James RESTON, "The Courts and the Press," c. 1979 New York Times 
News Service, Tom WICKER, "A Chilling Court," c. 1979 New York Times News Service, 
both published on the same page by such a regional newspaper as The Times Record, 
Brunswick, Maine, April 25, 1979, p. 4. See also, Clayton FRITCHEY, "Byron White's Brief 
Against the Media," The Washington Post, April 28, 1979, p. A17. Compare with these, 
James J. KILPATRICK, "The Court and the Press," The Washington Star, p. A-13, in which, 
looking at Justice White's opinion, Mr KILPATRICT wrote: "I fail to see what all the 
hollering is about." 
111. Clayton FRITCHEY, "Byron White's Brief Against the Media," The Washington Post, April 
28, 1979, p. A17. 
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majority of the Court or with the criticism directed at the Court by the press, 
one should at least pause and reflect on a celebrated opinion expressed by an 
English judge over five hundred years ago: "2 
It is common knowledge that the thought of man shall not be tried, for the devil 
himself knoweth not the thought of man. 
Summary and Conclusion 
During the past fifteen years there has been a dramatic change in the 
law applicable to civil and criminal liability for defamation. Indeed, during 
this period the common law applicable to libelous utterances that had 
prevailed in the United States since the country was founded was all but 
swept away. It all started with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, decided in 
1964, when the common law of libel was found not to give sufficient 
protection to the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and 
press. At first, this was said to be true in a civil action for damages in a libel 
case, but soon, in Garrison v. Louisiana, also decided in 1964, the same was 
said to be true in criminal actions for seditious libel. In both instances, proof 
that false statements were made with actual malice, i.e., with the knowledge 
that they were false, or proof that such statements were made with reckless 
disregard of whether they were false or not was said to be essential. 
At first, this new standard of proof which protects even the untrue if it is 
mere understandable and incidental error of fact, was applied only to 
"public officials." However, this standard of proof was soon applied to 
"public figures" as well. Moreover, there were those on the Court who 
would have applied the same standard to private individuals who suddenly 
find themselves unwillingly or unwittingly thrust upon the public scene. But 
before long, a distinction was drawn between "public officials" and "public 
figures" when, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, decided in 1967, a plurality 
opinion favored a different standard for the latter — a standard based on 
"highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the 
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible 
publishers"3." Then, there was the protection given private individuals 
when, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., decided in 1974, the Court held that as 
to these the New York Times rule does not apply and the States can decide for 
themselves the standard of liability for publishers and broadcasters of 
defamatory falsehood injurious to them. And finally, there is Herbert v. 
Lando, decided in 1979, which permits plaintiffs in libel actions to "focus on 
the conduct and state of mind of the defendant" "4 as he seeks to establish 
the critical elements of proof required by the New York Times rule. 
112. BRIAN, j . , Y.B., 17 Edw IV, Pasche, f. 2 (1477). 
113. 385 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
114. 60 L Ed 2d 115, 124 (1979). 
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Thus, in the short span of fifteen years the Supreme Court of the United 
States has traveled a considerable distance from the rigid rule that it 
announced in 1964 in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. At first, the Court 
appeared to be inclined to extend the rule to greater and more far-reaching 
horizons, only to then shift its direction in what appears to be a more limited 
application of the rule. Of course, to a considerable extent this shift was due 
to a change in the composition of the Court. Actually, the shift was dictated 
by the departure from the Court of such men as Chief Justice Warren and 
Justices Black and Douglas who held liberal views in the area of speech and 
press, and the replacement of these three with Justices with more conser-
vative views. But then, at a time when four of the nine Justices are eligible for 
retirement — five in January, 1980 — it is not unreasonable to expect further 
change in the composition of the Court and another shift of direction in such 
matters as speech and press. Whether a further shift will be to the right or to 
the left will depend on who the replacements are and, indeed, who sits in the 
White House when the replacements are named. There might even be a 
return to a more scholarly Court such as the one that Franklin D. Roosevelt 
put together during his years as President of the United States. 
